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John Stuart Mill has become an iconic figure of liberalism. Nevertheless, his cre-
dentials as a liberal have occasionally been doubted. For instance, in a recent 
study, Gregory Claeys claims: “We make Mill ‘liberal’ by rendering invisible 
his illiberal themes, in a manner not unlike the old Stalinist erasing of unpersons 
from pictures.”1  Anti-liberal strands in Mill’s work have been alleged before.2  
Although I believe that these charges are based on faulty interpretations, there 
is a basis in Mill’s work for the doubts that some scholars express regarding his 
credentials as a liberal. In particular, Mill allows and even encourages certain 
interactions, which seem to be fairly similar to undue interference with individual 
autonomy, with other people’s self-regarding conduct. Among the important ex-
amples of this type of interpersonal engagement are what Mill calls “natural pen-
alties,” upon which this article focuses. I argue that, far from being an aberration 
in Mill’s thinking, natural penalties play a vital role in his brand of liberalism: 
they serve to enable the interpersonal negotiation, within society, of the proper 
boundaries of the self-regarding sphere. Natural penalties express personal con-
victions regarding which conduct should be subject to social coercion. Because 
natural penalties can themselves be answered and rejected, they are part of an ex-
pressive dialogue within society about the normative status of types of behavior; 
whether they are acceptable or should be considered harmful to others.
In Section 1, I explain Mill’s understanding of natural penalties. In line with 
his thinking, I distinguish between natural penalties and coercive social punish-
ment. I use the term engagement to include both coercive and noncoercive forms 
of interaction with the conduct of others. Natural penalties are direct, disapprov-
ing reactions toward the conduct of others. Importantly, some of that conduct 
may not justify punishment and, indeed, seems to be protected by Mill’s liberty 
principle. In other words, natural penalties even apply within an area that should 
be absolutely free from forms of social compulsion—the self-regarding sphere.
Since natural penalties are instruments to influence the future will-formation 
of other people, from a liberal perspective they require close scrutiny. It is true 
that natural penalties allow their targets to keep the same set of options, but they 
can nevertheless influence choices by making it harder to pursue the options 
which trigger natural penalties by others. We are social animals and we tend to 
consider the threat of disapproving reactions as possible reasons against certain 
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of Social Philosophy published by Wiley Periodicals LLC 
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original work is properly cited.
DOI: 10.1111/josp.12344
JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 0 No. 0, Spring 2020, 1–19.
bs_bs_banner
2  Thomas Schramme
conduct. This suggests that natural penalties have the potential to become threats 
to individual liberty.
In Section 2, I introduce interpretations of the role of natural penalties within 
Mill’s work, by Joseph Hamburger, Gregory Claeys, Jonathan Riley, and Jeremy 
Waldron. These philosophers discuss the relation between natural penalties and 
institutionalized modes of sanction, such as social compulsion and legal coercion. 
They see Mill’s account of natural penalties as i) evidence of his somewhat con-
cealed opposition to a wide range of individual freedoms (Hamburger, Claeys); 
ii) in no conflict whatsoever with Mill’s defense of individual liberty (Riley), 
or iii) as indicating at least a tension in Mill’s thinking (Waldron). I will call 
these three different accounts of the relation between natural penalties and social 
coercion the inseparability interpretation (Hamburger and, partly, Claeys), the 
separability interpretation (Riley) and the antagonistic interpretation (Waldron). 
I will eventually advocate a fourth reading, which I call the harmonistic interpre-
tation. It defends the harmony, indeed, the inherent connection, between Mill’s 
opposition to social coercion within the self-regarding sphere and his emphasis on 
natural penalties. I will argue that Mill’s appeal to natural penalties enables him 
to account for the mutual interest that people have in each other, which includes 
the desire to exert interpersonal influence, and to debar coercive intrusion into 
the concerns of others. In short, Mill shows us a way to be liberal without being 
indifferent toward one another.
To pave the way for this conclusion, I will briefly explain, in Section 3, my 
understanding of the liberty principle, which to my mind does not allow us to 
always theoretically decide the question whether conduct is self-regarding or not, 
for instance by a philosophical analysis of the notion of harm to others. Section 4 
then discusses the nature of natural penalties within the wider systematic frame-
work of moral psychology, especially in relation to the “reactive attitudes,” as 
introduced by Peter Strawson. My focus is on the expression of contempt. This is 
one of the main examples of natural penalties in Mill’s discussion. Philosophers 
have recently become increasingly interested in contempt. I will argue that ex-
pressions of contempt are an example of a contribution to the social process of 
negotiating the proper boundaries of the self-regarding sphere and hence of the 
specific contours of individual liberty. Natural penalties, therefore, fulfill a valu-
able function within Mill’s liberal framework. Section 5 discusses some potential 
risks of expressions of contempt. Section 6 concludes.
1. Might Natural Penalties Threaten Individual Liberty?
Mill draws an important conceptual distinction between coercive or authori-
tative interference with individual liberty and noncoercive or nonauthoritative 
interventions, such as giving advice or providing information.3  In On Liberty he 
also makes it clear that he is concerned mainly with the more forceful forms of in-
tervention. Mill is unambiguous in his rejection of coercive social control within 
the self-regarding sphere. Nevertheless, he permits certain forms of engagement 
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with the self-regarding conduct of other people that are not easily distinguish-
able, especially in respect of their effects, from compulsion. Of course, whether 
this really poses a serious threat to Mill’s liberal credentials remains to be seen. 
Suffice it to say, for now, that a purely conceptual distinction between coercion 
and noncoercive engagement with individual freedom is insufficient to settle the 
issue: we must probe deeper into the details of Mill’s remarks about natural penal-
ties. In On Liberty, Chapter 4, Mill writes:
I do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by others, ought not to be 
in any way affected by his self-regarding qualities or deficiencies. This is neither possible 
nor desirable. If he is eminent in any of the qualities which conduce to his own good, he 
is, so far, a proper object of admiration. He is so much the nearer to the ideal perfection of 
human nature. If he is grossly deficient in those qualities, a sentiment the opposite of admi-
ration will follow. There is a degree of folly, and a degree of what may be called (though 
the phrase is not unobjectionable) lowness or depravation of taste, which, though it cannot 
justify doing harm to the person who manifests it, renders him necessarily and properly a 
subject of distaste, or, in extreme cases, even of contempt. (…) We have a right, also, in 
various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of 
his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We are not bound, for example, to seek his 
society; we have a right to avoid it (though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a 
right to choose the society most acceptable to us. (…) In these various modes a person may 
suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others, for faults which directly concern only 
himself; but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural, and, as it were, 
the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves, not because they are purposely 
inflicted on him for the sake of punishment. A person who shows rashness, obstinacy, 
self-conceit—who cannot live within moderate means—who cannot restrain himself from 
hurtful indulgences—who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and 
intellect—must expect to be lowered in the opinion of others, and to have a less share of 
their favourable sentiments.4 
From what we learn here, natural penalties very likely have the power to change 
the future will-formation and hence the conduct of people subjected to them. 
Accordingly, they can be deemed engagements with individual liberty. Even 
though, strictly speaking, these penalties appear not always to be inflicted delib-
erately, they are probably often motivated by a desire to change the behaviour of 
others. We normally do not simply state our distaste about other people’s con-
duct, or simply express our contempt toward them on account of it. Rather, when 
a person acts in a way that arouses our distaste or contempt, we want them, even if 
we do not say so, to cease acting in that way. Obviously, our reactions in such cir-
cumstances can have a considerable impact on the offender. Our reactions might 
cause embarrassment or shame and hence eventually a modification of conduct. 
Even if natural penalties are not coercive, there might still be good reasons, from 
a liberal point of view, to try to suppress these types of engagement, however 
strong the urge to inflict them might be, because they possibly manipulate the 
will-formation of people and reduce the scope of their individuality.
What is more, the number of occasions for, and probably the appetite for 
engagement with, other people have very likely increased since Mill’s time. 
For instance, quite a few types of online engagement with others amount to the 
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application of natural penalties within the self-regarding sphere. Some of these 
are normatively significant from a liberal point of view. Consider, for example, 
the case of Lindsey Stone, an American who occasionally took photographs she 
knew some people might find offensive. Her friend took a picture of Lindsey 
making an obscene gesture toward a sign that advised visitors to a military cem-
etery to behave respectfully. This photograph was posted to Facebook, and as a 
result, she was condemned for behaving disrespectfully toward veterans and the 
army more generally.5  Today, we call such consequences a “shitstorm,” and we 
probably all know of numerous examples of a similar kind. When disapproval is 
expressed in such public and vehement ways, it certainly amounts to what Mill 
would consider to be a natural penalty. It also comes close to being coercive 
social punishment in Mill’s sense, because of the impact it has on Lindsey’s ex-
pression of her individuality.6 
Natural penalties can accordingly be deemed at least potentially undue inter-
ferences with individual autonomy. As mentioned, Mill explicitly allows natural 
penalties to penetrate the self-regarding sphere, which is supposedly absolutely 
protected from interference. As he famously put it at the beginning of On Liberty, 
for each person, “[i]n the part which merely concerns himself, his independence 
is, of right, absolute”.7  We should postpone our verdict on whether natural pen-
alties actually amount to a problematic form of intervention into individual au-
tonomy to a later stage in the argument. That said, Mill’s remarks about them 
provide a prima facie justification for the concern that he might not have been an 
advocate of, or at least not a consistent advocate of, a strong version of liberalism. 
Hamburger seems justified in maintaining that “it is difficult to know what Mill 
intended in the passages on distaste and contempt if he did not expect that men 
would be ’pressed’ into a less depraved way of living.”8  Hamburger’s wording 
is certainly ambiguous and slightly extreme, but he seems to be making a valid 
point.
As mentioned, Mill draws an important conceptual distinction between co-
ercive social control, through laws and punishment, and noncoercive forms of 
engagement that aims to influence others, through natural penalties (and perhaps 
other modes of interaction, such as incentives). In addition, Mill’s understanding 
of the self-regarding sphere is not, as it were, solipsistic: he explicitly rejects the 
notion of individuals as unconnected, isolated beings.9  Mill is certainly not a lib-
eral who ignores social ties and duties. For him, people ought not to be indifferent 
to the interests of others. Antisocial conduct or a lack of due concern for others 
might well lead to justified social control. Hence within Mill’s framework, there 
is, indeed, ample space for social control: “Whoever fails in the consideration 
generally due to the interests and feelings of others (…) is a subject of moral 
disapprobation for that failure (…).”10  Given the scope of justifiable social con-
trol, it seems unnecessary—and unwanted from a liberal point of view—to allow 
and to even encourage interpersonal engagement via natural penalties within the 
self-regarding sphere as well.
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Mill supports the moral ideal of a society in which people are socially 
minded. There are numerous occasions for social control, if people do not con-
form to this ideal. The reason, though, for the harsher forms of control, such as 
punishment, has to be the breach of a social tie, in the form of a moral duty or of 
the requirements of reciprocity, not the fact that the conduct is merely disliked.11  
Purely self-regarding conduct should not be punished. Yet, Mill approves of a 
power that society has in addition to the compulsive power of moral and legal 
punishment. Society is “[a]ided by the natural penalties which cannot be pre-
vented from falling on those who incur the distaste or the contempt of those who 
know them.”12  Punishment is the sanction of social control, whereas penalties are 
not elements of public jurisdiction.13  Indeed, there is a terminological distinction 
between coercive intervention and noncoercive engagement with the conduct of 
others. Nevertheless, we might wonder whether this distinction can really ease 
philosophical concerns about Mill’s credentials as a liberal.14  In the next section, 
I will aim to elucidate the distinction with the help of those few philosophers who 
have explicitly discussed Mill’s account of natural penalties.15 
2. Philosophical Interpretations of Natural Penalties
In his book John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control, Joseph Hamburger aims 
to show the “full extent of the censoriousness unleashed by Mill.”16  Although 
Hamburger is aware of the distinction between coercion by deliberate punish-
ment, either through legal sanctions or social compulsion, and other forms of 
pressure, he stresses their continuity. According to this inseparability interpre-
tation, natural penalties are normatively inseparable from coercion and do not 
differ categorically from other forms of social control. It would not help to see 
natural penalties and social compulsion as located on different levels of a con-
tinuous scale of interferences with the liberty of others.17  This is because, even 
if we might be able to introduce thresholds, which would then allow us to draw 
a conceptual distinction between natural penalties and coercion, for Hamburger 
all these forms of interpersonal engagement are examples of social pressure that 
are equally experienced as intimidating and potentially humiliating.18  For natural 
penalties, “the coercive dimension of shaming and expressions of distaste and 
contempt cannot be easily discounted.”19 
Hamburger makes explicit the apparent discrepancy between, on the one 
hand, Mill’s strong defense of the self-regarding sphere as a realm to develop 
individuality and hence a sphere free from compulsion and social control and, 
on the other hand, his endorsement of interpersonal engagement within the 
self-regarding sphere. This undermines the seemingly fiercely policed boundary 
between the self-regarding sphere and the social sphere in Mill’s thinking.20  In 
consequence, Hamburger’s reading undermines Mill’s credentials as a champion 
of individual liberty and of the political philosophy of liberalism.21 
Similarly, Gregory Claeys suggests that in practice there are fine lines be-
tween, on the one hand, remonstrating and entreating (which are examples of 
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noncoercive engagement) and, on the other hand, visiting with evil (which coer-
cion involves).22  As he clearly states, “between them lies much of the everyday 
nonlegal regulation of behavior in the public sphere in particular.”23  In his book-
length treatment of Mill and paternalism, Claeys maintains: “[D]epending upon 
one’s sensitivity to others’ criticisms (we may recall Mill’s own acute anxieties 
here), even mild forms of reproachful disapproval might themselves constitute 
substantial ‘harm’.”24  Because popular opinion in societies might go in any di-
rection, there is a risk in allowing engagement with self-regarding conduct via 
natural penalties; the risk of restricting liberty for the wrong reasons and, in the 
worst-case scenario, the risk of “moral totalitarianism.”25 
In contrast to the inseparability interpretation, there are important normative 
differences between social sanctions (such as legal punishment) and natural pen-
alties (such as expressions of contempt). One important feature of natural pen-
alties, which will be emphasized in Section 4, is the possibility to interact with 
the person who expresses them and to reject their appropriateness. In contrast, 
coercive interferences are usually simply experienced. Once we see the different 
functions of natural penalties, as opposed to social sanctions, within liberal so-
cieties and also emphasize the role of the person on the receiving end of natural 
penalties, it will become clear that natural penalties are not coercive, after all. 
Although it might be granted that natural penalties are on a scale, and even on the 
same scale as coercive interferences, there are nevertheless important normative 
discontinuities between natural penalties and coercive instances of social control. 
What is more, natural penalties serve important functions that social coercion 
cannot fulfill. In sum, I think the inseparability interpretation fails.
Whereas for Hamburger “distaste and contempt constitute coercive pres-
sure,”26  Riley’s separability interpretation insists that we need to distinguish 
conceptually and normatively between natural penalties and coercion.27  They are 
separate forms of interaction that are built on different normative foundations.
Riley’s interpretation is partly a reply to Hamburger’s reading of Mill. As 
previously explained, for Hamburger the distinction between the self-regarding 
sphere and the social sphere loses normative bite, once engagement with self- 
regarding conduct through natural penalties becomes a justified option. In con-
trast, Riley insists that the normative reason for coercion is to prevent harm to 
others, whereas natural penalties are justified by the individual liberty of the per-
son applying them. According to this reading, natural penalties are expressions 
of valuable individuality. Hence, natural penalties are themselves types of self- 
regarding conduct.
Riley explains that natural penalties might involve harm to the person who 
applies them. For instance, when someone avoids a friend because she dislikes 
his behavior, she may suffer because of the loss of her friend’s affection and 
the like.28  Accordingly, there might seem to be a source of inconsistency in 
Mill’s theory, though a different source than on Hamburger’s interpretation. 
Conduct that others dislike can trigger the application of natural penalties. 
Thus, it can cause harm to those who are applying the natural penalties. This 
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might undermine the categorization of such disliked conduct as self-regarding. 
According to Riley, however, the agent applying the penalty has actually tacitly 
consented to the potential harm suffered in virtue of showing contempt and the 
like. The aforementioned inconsistency does not arise, because, for Mill, con-
duct that causes harm to which the harmed party has consented falls flatly into 
the self-regarding sphere.
Riley maintains, further, that although natural penalties clearly seem to in-
volve harm to those who are subjected to them, this harm is also implicitly con-
sented to. This is evidenced when the person who is subjected to natural penalties, 
and is aware of these, does not stop behaving in the way that triggers the appli-
cation of those penalties. Indeed, despite the natural penalties, their subject is al-
lowed to continue with the disliked self-regarding behavior. Therefore, according 
to Riley, and contrary to Hamburger, to be subjected to natural penalties is not 
thereby to be coerced, even though the subject of the penalties might perceive 
them as applying undue pressure.29 
For Riley, all agents “should be perfectly free to avoid anyone who does 
not accept their advice. Their freedom does not imply any deliberate intention to 
punish the person. Rather, the natural penalties are incidental by-products of their 
equal rights to avoid what they dislike in their self-regarding concerns.”30 
Riley rightly emphasizes that the subject of natural penalties usually still has 
a viable and reasonable choice to make, unlike someone who is being coerced. 
The subject can either abandon the disliked conduct or persist in it. It is true, of 
course, that resistance to the natural penalties might be psychologically difficult 
to achieve, especially when the subject feels sympathy for those who are applying 
the natural penalties.31  Still, resistance to such interpersonal engagement and de-
fense of one’s own way of living seems a common response. To be able to persist 
in one’s conduct at relatively low costs undermines the inseparability interpreta-
tion and speaks in favor of the separability interpretation.
However, there is another problem, which I believe Riley underestimates. 
Although the expressed disapprobation through the use of natural penalties seems 
occasionally unavoidable and indeed natural, the individual proneness to such 
engagement clearly appears to be in the control of agents—natural penalties are 
not always “incidental by-products” of individuality. We usually have some level 
of control over our emotions and we know of strategies for general emotion reg-
ulation.32  If natural penalties do not themselves serve a function, then we might 
rather want to suppress our tendency to apply them. In a word, natural penalties, 
especially contemptuous attitudes, are themselves to be assessed from a moral 
point of view, and they are not straightforwardly justified.33  While Riley’s inter-
pretation makes the elements of Mill’s account coherent, it does not address the 
remaining worry that it might not be possible to justify natural penalties within a 
liberal framework, even if they are not coercive.
Mill himself appears to have been ambivalent about natural penalties. He 
claims, on the one hand, that they are often properly applied, and that it is not 
desirable to abandon those reactions. Yet, on the other hand, he also says that it 
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would be desirable if people would warn each other of possible natural penalties, 
so that their application can be prevented:
Though doing no wrong to any one, a person may so act as to compel us to judge him, and 
feel to him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order: and since this judgment and feeling 
are a fact which he would prefer to avoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of it before-
hand, as of any other disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself. It would be 
well, indeed, if this good office were much more freely rendered than the common notions 
of politeness at present permit, and if one person could honestly point out to another that 
he thinks him in fault, without being considered unmannerly or presuming.34 
So it seems that Mill would like to see fewer occasions for natural penalties actu-
ally being applied, although he is also in favor of stating one’s disagreement with 
the problematic conduct of others. This is in line with his general commitment to 
utilitarianism and with the fact that any penalty has a detrimental effect in terms 
of happiness. Yet, it is hard to shake the feeling that the warnings that Mill recom-
mends still look problematic from a liberal point of view, because self-regarding 
conduct is usually nobody else’s business. It is not enough to warn someone of 
such a detrimental consequence, if the disapproving reaction is itself unjustified. 
The normative assessment of natural penalties is accordingly an important issue 
to which we will return in the fourth section.
Waldron’s antagonistic interpretation of Mill enables us to explain such 
ambivalence toward natural penalties. His interpretation can be dubbed “antag-
onistic,” because according to him natural penalties and social control have op-
posing purposes. Waldron highlights the fact that the unfavorable engagement of 
numerous people, which might individually be an expression of their freedom, 
might well lead to social pressure on minority views and people’s expressions 
of individuality. In this, he seems to agree with the inseparability interpretation.
People may have a right—or it may for other reasons be desirable for them to have the free-
dom—to do the things which, at least when taken en masse, constitute the social coercion 
which Mill is attempting to stop. Coercion by society consists, presumably, of a mass of 
actions, a1, a2, … an (where n is quite large), directed, say, at ostracizing some small circle 
of ethical or religious deviants. But any one of these actions, ai, may be something which 
a person has a right to perform.35 
Waldron argues that there is a related inherent tension between different 
people’s pursuit of their individuality. On the one hand, to restrict the expression 
of natural penalties, in order to protect self-regarding conduct from potential 
social pressure, is to restrict the individual liberty of some. On the other hand, to 
allow natural penalties may restrict the individual advancement of those people 
who wish to pursue disliked conduct. There is hence a conflict between the pro-
tection of individual expressions of liberty in the form of natural penalties and 
the safeguarding of individuality via restrictions on natural penalties. “It seems 
then that liberty is at risk on both sides of Mill’s equation. It is at risk, he argues, 
from social pressure. But it is at risk, too, if we try to limit or eliminate social 
pressure.”36 
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Waldron proceeds to argue that Mill needs to sort out the tension by distin-
guishing between the normatively problematic forms of social coercion and the 
valuable exchange of opinions about ways to live. In the final analysis, Waldron 
is sceptical that Mill can come up with a satisfactory account of the distinction 
as such.37 
Whether the tension that Waldron sees in Mill’s work is real and, whether, 
if it is, it, indeed, poses a threat to Mill’s liberal credentials are questions that 
cannot yet, based on our discussion so far, be decided. Much depends on the 
nature of natural penalties, and we have yet to learn enough about them to enable 
us to judge. It is true, of course, that such natural penalties as contempt and dis-
taste often have an inhibitive force on those who are subjected to them. There is 
no straightforward entailment from this observation, however, to the conclusion 
that these natural penalties really threaten liberty, and the growth of individual-
ity, in the manner claimed by Waldron. I will argue that—what I will call—the 
combative element of natural penalties actually serves an important function in 
Mill’s theory. Natural penalties are means of negotiating the proper boundaries of 
individual liberty and hence of the self-regarding sphere.
3. Indeterminate Boundaries of the Self-Regarding Sphere
Why should there be a need to negotiate the boundaries of the self-regarding 
sphere? After all, Mill famously put forward a liberty principle that only allows 
social control in cases where there is harm to others.38  If the liberty principle as 
such would offer criteria that determine which kinds of conduct fall into the self-
regarding sphere, then natural penalties do not seem to play a role in drawing the 
proper boundaries of that sphere.
On the face of it, the liberty principle proscribes coercive interference with 
another person’s self-regarding conduct and allows social jurisdiction in cases 
that harm others. But as we know it is notoriously difficult to determine the con-
tours of the self-regarding sphere. For instance, are offenses, which seem to fall 
short of harm, such as the aforementioned obscene gestures by Lindsey Stone, 
protected by the liberty principle?39  Why does Mill believe that some conduct, 
which should be allowed without interference when performed privately, might 
justify social control when done publicly?40  The answer is, to my mind, that Mill 
does not want the liberty principle itself to settle all these cases. What is regarded 
as harmful to others and what is seen as falling into the self-regarding sphere, is 
occasionally to be determined by reasoning and interpersonal engagement.
Mill demarcates self-regarding conduct by introducing the contrasting crite-
rion of “definite damage, or a definite risk of damage” to others. He also says that 
“with regard to the merely contingent, or, as it may be called, constructive injury, 
which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any specific 
duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual 
except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the 
sake of the greater good of human freedom.”41 
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It seems to me that the last part of this quotation, highlighting that society 
can afford to bear some inconveniences for the sake of the greater good of human 
freedom, is evidence of Mill’s account of the negotiable boundary between the 
self-regarding sphere and harm to others. Society is supposed to balance individ-
ual freedom and social control. Therefore, it needs to determine which conduct 
constitutes more than an inconvenience that can be borne for the sake of freedom. 
This task is not a matter of conceptual analysis, for instance about the proper in-
terpretation of the notion of harm. It is rather concerned with the most convincing 
case for the protection of individual liberty. Mill counts on members of society 
either being intrinsically interested in freedom or at least acknowledging the in-
strumental value of granting liberty for social development.42  It is then a matter of 
normative argument and engagement where exactly to draw the line of legitimate 
social control.
According to my reading, the liberty principle has two functions. In terms 
of its being a moral maxim, it proscribes interference with conduct that clearly 
falls into the self-regarding sphere, for instance, the choice of what clothes people 
may wear in their home. In addition, it is also a deliberative principle guiding 
normative considerations over and above the clear-cut cases. It says how society 
should think about possible interventions into individual conduct. This is made 
more obvious when Mill states that the principle should govern “the dealings of 
society with the individual,” and also that it determines the purposes or reasons 
for which social intervention may be considered.43  It is hence a principle directing 
our normative considerations in society.
I believe this aspect of the liberty principle—offering deliberative guid-
ance—should be emphasized because occasionally Mill’s principle was criticized 
for not being sufficiently determinate to tell us what we may do, or for leading to 
possible conflicts with his utilitarian creed.44  It seems apparent to me from what 
Mill has to say in On Liberty, especially in his final chapter on “Applications,” 
that the principle calls for a considerable amount of practical reasoning, because 
not every single case straightforwardly falls into the sphere of the self-regarding, 
where there should be no social control, or the sphere of the social, where harm to 
others may legitimately be prevented. His principle, therefore, cannot, or cannot 
always, directly lead to conclusions about whether to intervene.45  Nevertheless, 
it can guide society regarding how to think properly about when to use social 
compulsion:
I offer, not so much applications, as specimens of application: which may serve to bring 
into greater clearness the meaning and limits of the two maxims which together form the 
entire doctrine of this Essay and to assist the judgment in holding the balance between 
them, in the cases where it appears doubtful which of them is applicable to the case.46 
Natural penalties are part and parcel of the deliberative process regarding the 
proper boundaries of the self-regarding sphere; a process that is supposed to be 
guided—but not fully determined—by the doctrine of liberty.
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4. The Functions of Natural Penalities
Can natural penalties be justified, especially from a liberal point of view? It 
appears that natural penalties cannot always be prevented, because as social be-
ings we show reactions toward the conduct of others. Still, they are often purpose-
ful expressions of disapproval and so we should think about their justification. If 
we disapprove of other’s conduct, we might show our distaste or even contempt. 
We often do so even though the conduct we reject does not warrant social pun-
ishment, and even when we ourselves agree that coercive forms of interference 
would not be legitimate.
A means of reconciling natural penalties with liberalism is offered by linking 
Mill’s discussion with more recent debates in moral psychology. When Mill dis-
cusses natural penalties, he refers to certain kinds of engagement that are similar 
to expressions of what Peter Strawson called “reactive attitudes”47  and to the 
manifestation of what contemporary philosophers call “retributive emotions.”48  
To be sure, Mill’s notion of natural penalties includes more varieties than reactive 
attitudes in the usual understanding of the term; for instance, he mentions avoid-
ing others as a case in point. Natural penalties also explicitly exclude resentment, 
which is restricted to social punishment in Mill’s theory49  but which is, according 
to Strawson, the main type of reactive attitude. In addition, it should be made 
explicit that Mill does not see natural penalties as reactions only to moral wrongs. 
Moral wrongs deserve social punishment, whereas natural penalties can apply 
within the self-regarding sphere. Hence the kinds of reactions that are natural pen-
alties are only some specimens of expressions of what has been discussed under 
the label of reactive attitudes. For these reasons, the notion of reactive attitudes 
might be deemed unhelpful. However, this worry does not matter much for my 
systematic point here. I am using the terminology of reactive attitudes because it 
has been discussed in the philosophical literature as a natural phenomenon and 
also as something that cannot be fully controlled by the person who shows such 
reactions. It is also a helpful analogy because reactive attitudes, like natural pen-
alties, are based on a concern for others and an appreciation of their responsibility 
for their own conduct. This is precisely the kind of social concern that Mill identi-
fied as a motivational basis for natural penalties. My aim is to use the terminology 
and context of the debate on reactive attitudes to illuminate Mill’s account of 
natural penalties.
The expression of contempt is probably the most suitable test case to enable 
assessment of the detrimental effects of natural penalties on individual liberty, 
because contempt is among the harshest manifestation of the reactive attitudes. 
If even the expression of contempt serves a legitimate social function within a 
liberal framework, then less severe forms of natural penalties should be justifiable 
as well.
The Oxford English Dictionary describes contempt as a “feeling of dislike or 
hostility towards a person or thing one regards as inferior, worthless, or despica-
ble” and as “an attitude expressive of such a feeling.”50  Macalester Bell, who has 
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published a philosophical study of contempt, states that it is “a way of negatively 
and comparatively regarding or attending to someone who is presented as falling 
below the contemnor’s personal baseline. This form of regard constitutes a with-
drawal from the target and may motivate further withdrawal.”51 
The expression of contempt poses a particular threat to individual liberty. 
The mere passive phenomenon of harboring a feeling of contempt without ac-
tively pursuing it, does not initially lead to the same liberal concern, though it 
should be remembered that disengagement and avoidance can be a sign of active 
contempt.52  Interestingly, later we will see that purely passive contempt might be 
the more problematic form because it might show an unwanted (from a Millian 
point of view) level of indifference toward others. Contempt should be combat-
ive in order to fulfill its functions, that is, it should confront the other with one’s 
discontent.
Contempt can address moral wrongs, for instance when we react toward a 
defendant’s callous reaction during a trial. More importantly for our purposes, 
we can also be contemptuous toward conduct we would not call immoral, but 
which could be deemed ethically relevant.53  An example is contempt expressed 
toward an immodest person. Immodesty, even arrogance, does not normally vi-
olate social moral norms, but it is an aspect of character and of an experiment in 
living that has normative significance. Strawson expressed that idea well, albeit 
in a different context than his treatment of reactive attitudes: “The region of the 
ethical, then, is a region of diverse, certainly incompatible and possibly practi-
cally conflicting ideal images or pictures of a human life, or of human life (…).”54 
So within Mill’s analysis, expressed contempt can have the function of ex-
pressing or accompanying social punishment, applied in response to conduct that 
is within the social sphere, but it can also, more interestingly for current purposes, 
work within the self-regarding sphere. Let us focus on examples of expressed 
contempt for conduct that is not clearly immoral, but which is ethically relevant, 
such as in the aforementioned case of Lindsey Stone.
Being contemptuous involves seeing something or someone in a negative 
light. It is usually a specific form of criticism that involves disvaluing the conduct 
or attitudes of another person. In the following section, we will discuss whether 
this particular aspect of “looking down” raises legitimate moral concerns, but for 
now I want to focus on the valuing function of contempt. As Bell has explained in 
her detailed study of its moral characteristics, contempt can be a form of protest.55  
Contempt of the protesting type can be merely personal, in the following sense: It 
is possible to be contemptuous toward someone whose conduct (or attitudes) the 
contemptuous person disvalues without seeing others as obliged to disvalue that 
conduct (or those attitudes) too; think, for instance, of contempt toward a person 
who shows unpolished table manners. Nevertheless, contempt can also express 
a social demand, in the sense that a contemptuous person can believe that others 
should meet that conduct (or those attitudes) with similar contempt. Importantly 
for the purposes of my discussion, this will normally involve a desire of the 
contemptuous person that the conduct (or attitudes) protested against should be 
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socially punished. In more Millian terms, contempt can imply a statement that the 
alleged self-regarding conduct should actually be deemed to be of social concern, 
properly meriting social or legal punishment—that is, to be regarded as a moral 
issue in Mill’s sense.
Now, the person who is the subject of another’s expressed contempt can, 
in turn, react to that and defend her case. She can even be contemptuous toward 
the contempt of the other person. The subject of contempt might say: “How dare 
you criticise me; it’s none of your business, you nosy git!” In Millian terms, this 
would be a defense of the person’s conduct (or attitudes) as belonging to the 
self-regarding sphere, after all, and a claim regarding an obligation of the other 
person to acknowledge this. An expression of contempt can accordingly be a 
means of defending one’s own integrity.56 
What we see at work here is the communicative and especially the combative 
function of expressed contempt.57  Importantly, expressions of contempt can, like 
conversations, be interactive or dialogical. Coercion, in contrast, is a one-sided 
affair, involving an inequality of coercer and coerced in terms of their power and 
standing. Society should only apply coercion where it is certain that the relevant 
conduct should be prevented or punished. The combative function of contempt 
allows people to negotiate the contours of the self-regarding sphere, or—in other 
words—the contours of individual freedom. This is a substantial service within a 
Millian society, where these contours are in need of being constantly discussed, 
negotiated and shifted in order to enable individual and social progress.
It might be helpful to make explicit that in my reading of the functions of 
natural penalties, and specifically contempt, there is a possible aspect of nonvi-
cious circularity. Since natural penalties jeopardize individual liberty, it seems 
there should be a global requirement only to apply them when the target’s conduct 
justifies their application.58  On my account, however, such a global requirement 
would be pointless, because there are situations in which there is, prior to social 
negotiation, no fact of the matter about whether the requirement has been met. 
If we could always know, in advance of social negotiation, which conduct is no-
one else’s business and which is apt for legitimate social control, then we would, 
thereby, always be able to have a clear grasp of the contours of the self-regarding 
sphere. If that were so, we would, however, be back at the starting point of this 
paper, wondering why Mill was so keen on natural penalties. In such a scenario, 
natural penalties would not serve any obvious function within the self-regarding 
sphere; rather they would merely engage with conduct that we would know should 
be left free for people to pursue—hardly beneficial from a liberal point of view.
In reality, however, we often disagree on, or are unsure about, which sorts of 
conduct and attitudes are morally wrong. Lots of conduct calls for interpersonal 
negotiation to determine its status. Natural penalties are contributions to such 
social processes of settling the normative status of contested conduct. In other 
words, natural penalties can be evidence or symptoms of the presence of socially 
contested conduct that does not have a settled normative status. The mentioned 
possible circularity stems from the fact that the adequacy of natural penalties is 
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itself not fully independent of the current boundaries of the self-regarding sphere 
within a specific society. Disapprobation often transcends the socially accepted 
boundaries of individual freedom. In this way, natural penalties can be expres-
sions of individual desires for moral reform within society.59 
There is little doubt that Mill saw a kind of reformist function in natural pen-
alties. His overall project was the improvement of mankind.60  The self-regarding 
sphere should be a free haven for “experiments in living,” but it should not be 
free from all social interest. It should not be a sphere of indifference. People 
make mistakes, after all, they are often misguided in their decision making, or 
influenced by their circumstances. It appears then that in an ideal Millian society, 
everyone would have a clear sense of what conduct is socially acceptable for 
good reasons and what conduct would be the proper object of punishment. We 
would then all have justified beliefs regarding the boundary between social, or 
moral, concerns and self-regarding aspects of people’s lives, and we would be 
motivated to act accordingly. In other words, in a Milllian ideal society, there 
does not seem to be a proper role for natural penalties within the self-regarding 
sphere. But, of course, there is no Millian ideal society, and there probably will 
never be any. Hence natural penalties are required. Their role is to help determine 
the very boundary between the self-regarding and the social sphere. Natural pen-
alties, therefore, contribute to the adaptation of ethical viewpoints over time, in 
other words to social reform. Accordingly, it is even questionable whether the 
allegedly Millian ideal society really was Mill’s ideal. After all, it would be an 
ethically static society, something Mill clearly did not want.
5. The Risks of Expressed Contempt
I have defended expressions of even an extreme version of natural penalties, 
contempt, because it can serve an important normative function. Yet, there is a 
problem with contempt, specifically. Contempt seems to involve a condescending 
attitude, perhaps even a form of moral disrespect, toward another person. Partly 
this is due to the apparent assessment of another person as a whole person, not in 
terms of her specific characteristics. According to some philosophers, contempt 
is, indeed, holistic. In Stephen Darwall’s terms, contempt can lead to reducing 
other people to characters or kinds and to ignoring them as individuals.61 
First, unfocused contempt is a characterizing attitude: though its object is an individual, it 
views its object as exemplifying (contemptible) characteristics rather than as the particular 
individual he is. In effect, it reduces his worth to these contemptible features. Second, 
contempt sees its object as other and, crucially, as differing from the contemner in respect 
of the contemned’s contemptible features. And third, unfocused contempt characterizes its 
object, as from above as having lesser worth; it sees these characteristics as making him 
inferior through and through.62 
Indeed, the close proximity between contempt and coercion, which we have 
highlighted earlier, makes contempt a “risky form of moral address.”63  The main 
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problems, however, that contempt can be “unfocused”64  and disrespectful, actu-
ally do not apply in relation to natural penalties. It appears that contempt rather 
focuses on particular characteristics of a person, such as a lack of concern for 
others or an obnoxious stance on the value of religious symbols.65  Even where 
contempt is aimed at general dispositions or character traits of others, this does 
not mean that it reduces other people in their individuality or status. Contempt, 
indeed, often involves the assessment of global traits; but it does not imply an as-
sessment of the whole person. It is about certain characteristics she has, not what 
type of person she is altogether. Similarly, from a virtue theoretical point of view, 
we could say that contempt focuses on vices, not on bad persons.
The other complaint regarding contempt is that it is disrespectful. Contemners 
seem to hold that they are better persons, morally speaking, than the contemned. 
Now, it is true, of course, that a person expressing contempt usually believes that 
the other person is worse in a specific aspect than an alternative person who does 
not have that trait.66  That is one important reason why contempt is normally a 
form of criticism or protest. But contempt does not usually involve disrespect 
in any morally relevant sense. Michelle Mason and others have pointed out that 
contempt concerns a different form of respect than the basic moral respect we 
owe to every person. We may disrespect someone in the “appraisal” sense, but 
still, morally respect them in the “recognition” sense of the term.67  When, in 
expressing contempt toward the contemned person, the contemner engages with 
the contemned person, thereby sending a message to, and protesting against, the 
contemned person, the contemner shows a sign of respecting the contemned as 
someone who can be held responsible and is not “beneath contempt.” This, of 
course, is a point already made by Strawson: reactive attitudes are inclusive in 
that they are applied only to those beings that we deem to be members of our 
moral community.68 
For Mill as well, natural penalties are means of social inclusion, not exclusion, 
because they are evidence of civic interest in others. They are meant to oppose 
the repressive tolerance that we find in indifference toward others.69  To suppress 
any reaction, indeed, to take an objective attitude toward others, as Strawson fa-
mously called it, is to deny their status as agents capable of bearing responsibility 
for their deeds. This is why passive contempt, which is purely evasive and does 
not really engage with the other, is problematic. Contempt is hence doubly risky 
from a moral point of view. On the one hand, it can become dangerously close 
to being coercive. On the other hand, it can turn into an objective attitude, where 
there is no scorn, merely indifference toward the contemned person as a member 
of society, combined with a rejection of their conduct.70 
Given the permissibility of natural penalties, and their function, a Millian 
type of society requires strong characters, who can stand up for their way of life 
and are not easily pushed over by the opinions of their fellow citizens. Mill’s 
ideal society enables individuality. To achieve this ideal sets a demanding task for 
individuals. It also asks of societies to achieve social conditions so that individ-
ual liberty can prevail. The acknowledgment and appreciation of the normative 
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difference between coercive social control and the expression of reactive attitudes 
emerge not merely from philosophical argument but also from lived experience.
6. Conclusion
In the past, natural penalties have typically been seen as undermining the 
liberal character of Mill’s theory, or as at least introducing tension in his thinking. 
In contrast, I have argued that natural penalties, even though they are applicable 
within the self-regarding sphere, are in harmony with Mill’s defense of individual 
liberty. This is mainly because, unlike coercion, natural penalties allow for inter-
active negotiation and they regularly apply to socially contested conduct of un-
certain moral value. Indeed, natural penalties, especially expressions of contempt, 
play a vital role in determining the very boundaries of the self-regarding sphere 
within real societies. Nevertheless, expressions of contempt and the like are, from 
a liberal point of view, risky forms of interpersonal engagement. Yet, if my argu-
ment has been successful, the role of natural penalties within Mill’s thought, and 
liberalism more generally, has been vindicated.71 
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